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Managing the windfall gains aid allow prodLCtioll to shif tfolml exports to (dolimeStic markets have n otIhinlg to slhow for it at the enidc of the boom and(i find( it diffictilt to\ tinlto the IiSali-11gmIlent in rIlative prices produced by the boonv 'his bookiet focuscs oll the management of comimilloditv price volatility t'r-omil the perspective of developinig countries. It examines and conltrasts goveriin menit policies anid institutional aldid mi-ketinig strLlctul-s that have p1oveII to he effeftive ill mnanaginig com modity booms-and liuIsts.
Michael Btrulio
Senlliol Vice P'resident, Development Fcollomilics and1 (i Cief [Lcolloiiist even wheln producers are aware that the boom is tetmiporary. 'T'lhis call lead to overcapacity and much lower prices later anid can have lolng-termii effects on a cotIntr,vs diversification elforts. Liberalizing and developing finianlcial markets canl provide altei-rnative inivestiments. l I nderldevcloped domestic financial and capital markets, however, may niot be maucIh of a prioblem it prodLucers canl invest freely abroad.
Trade policics cani also par-tly dleterminieii the effects of a comlmllloditv boom. If they preveint revenllies I-roin being spent oni imports, trade restrictions many lead to fuLr-thier-apre( iation of-the exchange rate.
Learning froimi experienice
In the past, governiinetits introdLuced varioLus policies to mianage booims and avoid thle onset of DLitch disease-I[lhey haive followed prudent fiscal policies, lifted impor-t and capital restr-ictionis, tightened monietary policies, accumILulated foreigni reseives, and rediuced foreigin debt. lut what were the specific measures, and how etffective were thev?
Ixp()I (IxCS. InI tile latest coffee hoom, ( ameroon, (,cte dlvoire, Honduras, lIgaida, \iet Nain, anid others reinltiodLuced export taxes. SuLCh taxes, so the argument goes, can alleviate both the spending and the resource movement effects of tile hoom and protect noinihbootminig tradable sectois. ' lax teveILIes should be invested in high-yielding public investment programs that inicrease long-term growth. Maintaining high staU dards of pi ject eva I-nat ion is also illpo-talit.
Inl pri`actiC, hll )eCVei-, talX rates lre uaLIS1l,1y set too llighl an1(d pLiblic inivestment p-rojects ale oftell selected on n1onetCOnIOmliC grOulids. Ib'is has dlaaged the bo omiiiig sectlor with little cominpensation elsewhere in the econioniy. I gligh export taxes also enlcloul-age tax evasioni and smugglilg.
Commoility bo,mn lyoids. 'Ihese are bo( nds denominated in lforeign currenicv hel(d bv local expor-ters of cominmodities. 'Ihe bonds canl be conlsidered as forced sa\vings in l'oreign curr-ency. I heir purpose is to protect the econollmi of the coinmmodity-exportinig c ouItitV hroml the effec(-ts of a sLiddeni inflow of loieigin excChainge. For example, dueL to a rise in conlinoditv pr-ices in Colomnbia the cenltral bank issued "coffee bonds" to Colombiahii coffee producers in exchInIge for fol-eigil (curi-ency eal-rle(d from exports. ( offee exporters were reCLuirled to hold( a certaill percentage of their dollar-dlenominated revelnues ini these bonds.
IHeidgin-' inst(uinelis. Covern ments and t[ ) private sector-can make fLutlure revelLnus mnore pre(lictable by tisiing options, futLl-es, and swaps. ' [he NMexi(all goVernlmllelit used sLIcI hIedgilng tools to eCIsure a gLaranteed price for its oil (and predictable revnTIues) after the Gulf war.
'I raders and producers, too, could benetit froim hedgiing. Some developing co( ntries would haive tiouble in using hedging i nStlu iLeltS, hoWeVer. Also, hedging c-ani he costly, requireS g(ood cr-edit ratinlgs, and is mole effective wheni used to cover coininCodi ty prices lor a relatively short period( of tililC-a1boLIt a yearI1 for m1oSt (olinn1o(litiCs.
Rev'n li stbilti liofltm flintlls. Aniother-wav to manage commiiilodity price shocks is to create a stabilization f'Land to stabilize gocvcrnmilent expendlituL-es (not to suppro0t or stabilizc comillodlitv pirices). By savinig resouIrces ill boom yealrS, governl1me'nts can redu-e the nteed to CUt Spellding in lealer times. A well-dcsigned fuintd canl smloothi expenlditulre adjustments upward andl downward. I lowever, fuindis often] runL ilnto difficulties becauIse of' the u rlpedictable nature of cornoniodity prices or in isilmallageCImenlt of1 tunid IreSOLur'CeS. Init'rat7 until( ( 0oniinCdy , I(7t'ntC1tt. [iUring the late 1 97)s and the I 98tis anyliv c oin modlity-pCrodtucilng coun1tries altemClpted to stabilize comnmiiodity prices (colicc, (ocoa, 
rI.
( ;vOernivi
IcIItS should0 ILot
COIoiiI it to 10log-terili spendin(ig levels that they Canno110t SLut ni VsliLn thl th bOOMl fizzles. 'I 'li is will help avoid a real ex( hl nge rate appreci' iOIl a 11(1 v ill imi provcecitnltlin itrf(iciicy. I'li1en, whleni the ltho tli ends, thle
econoimlv will he in better condition than it was before the boom.
Diversifi' and adjust. It is less paiiifitl to begin sucIh programs when prices are higil, and booming sectors will be better able to cope with lower commodity prices wheln the boom subsides. 
Why booms happen
Booming commodiity prices can help or hurt developing-country economies that export these commodities, dependinig on how governmncits handle (or mishanidle) the booml anid, more particularly, how they spend the windfall export revenues.
Althougih most comimilodity price fluctuations are subject to longrun cycles, there are also short-term variations (booms or busts) whiose effects are in essenice quite similar. Comimi(odity booms happen every ten years or so. The longest and stronlgest booms were the two in the ] 970s, when prices rose bv 240 percenit in nominiial terms; the most recent boomn began in 1 992. Andt altiloLugIl there are some similarities between the 1970s and thie latest price increases, there are also some imlportant differences (box 1 ). Thle recenlt surge in prices appears to be based on supplv shocks, not onl incr-eased demaid. This suggests that prices will fall as production returins to norimial or highier levels. AlthougIl many commoditv prices have probably peaked, developing countries still have an opportunity (albeit brief) to improve their fiscal positions before prices fall.
Most exporits of developing couLntries are in primary commodities. Includinig energy, these accoulited for 76 percent of Africa's merchliandise exports in 1992 and 47 percenit of merchandise exports for all lowand middle-inlcomile couLntries. For severely indebted coulitr-ies, the figtire was 61 percent. Iuels, minerals, and metals make Lip aboLut 29 percent of developing-counltlr export earninigs, with agricultural products (includinig timber) accouniting for anotiler 18 perceit.
Thus developilIg couLntries rely on comimii(odities for much of their export eariniigs. The latest boom has favored these counitries because the prices of the comimillodities they export (such as coffee, cottoin, and copper) have genlerally risen more thani the prices of those that they import (grains, petroleum, and so on). I ligher cottoni prices benefited couLntries in Sub-Saharan Afirica and( Central Asia; Latin Americanl export revenues rose on the back of booming copper prices and highier coffee prices, whicih also benefited Sub-Saharan Africa.
Llncertainities associated with commodity booms mlake any kinid of planniniig difficult. Bliulper years are oftenl followed bv busts that typicallv leave real prices lower thanl before. When revenLues fromli comilmodity 
Box 1. Boom, boom
The recent commodity boom differs from that of the 1 970s in several ways.
In 1973 the prices of two of the most sensitive commodity groups (grains and energy) increased sharply. Although grain prices have risen this year as well, their 25 percent rise is far below the doubling of prices that took place in the 1970s. This might be why the current boom has not attracted much attention. Moreover, the Soviet Union, which imported large quantities of grain in the early 1970s, no longer exists, and the import demand of the newly independent states is severely curtailed by foreign exchange constraints and weak economies. Fertilizer prices have risen recently because of production capacity constraints and sharp increases in demand, but by less than in the 1970s. This means that the crop yield effects of higher fertilizer prices are less today than during the 1970s. In the unlikely event that petroleum prices move sharply upward, the increase in fertilizer prices should be reversed as production responds to higher prices.
Another difference between the two booms is the role of commodity funds. The emergence of large commodity funds in the 1980s has perhaps caused some changes in commodity market fundanmentals. The emergence of funds has increased competition among those willing to hold commodity stocks and has increased the arbitrage possibilities in the market (prices respond faster to events). At times, funds may have accentuated commodity price trends. Some analysts have found an association between fund activities and the level of prices during 1994 for certain commodities, such as cocoa and metals.
Although the price rises for some commodities have been large, they scarcely compensate for the declines of the past decades. Aluminum prices, for instance, have yet to approach the highs of the mid-1980s. Coffee, which has more than doubled in price in the past year, is still at less than 30 percent of the peaks reached in the 1 970s. Cotton, cocoa, and copper prices are about one-third of the highs of the 1960s and 1970s in real terms. And while petroleum prices have increased recently, they are still below their 1992 and 1993 levels.
Why this boom won't continue
A commoiditv booml is a sharp prict r ise in a number of comniodities over a relativelv shiort period of time (t) ull to about two to tlhree years). 
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Why the recent surge in prices? Declining commodity prices throughout the 1980s led to reduced investment in production capacity, which ('rals. An increase in global demiiand and a reduction in world stocks have pLushed metal and milleral pirices higher. Voluntary productionl cuthacks aned restructuring in miining, processing, and fabrication have also tightened supplies and increased prices futhier for some metals. I I ighel metal prices have bee n partly credited to speculative buyilng by commodity utnlds. If so, the boomil in prices will be short-lived and may already be over for iallny metals.
Crude oil. Aftel shortages durinlg the (;ulf wai', oil supplies picked up in 1993 and prices fell significantly, before rebouLn1lilig in the second qIuarter of 1994. World oil demilanid will probably grow modestly for the rest of the 1 990s, and crude oil prices al-e ulilikely to rise much, especially if Iraqli crude ree nters world markets. (table 2) . Agri-icultul-al exports accouiiited for 70) percernt of the total increase in export revenLues, alld coffee for hilf the increase in agricultur-e exports.
'Ihe gains fromil highier-export prices were widespread (table 3) . Latin America and(I the ( aribbeanl notchied up the largest gainis, followed by last Asia and(I tlhe Pacific. Latin America and the Caribbean benefited molst from tht heoooim in coftfee prices, althoughli other comimloldities, includling metals, also contribUted. For last Asia and the Pacific, the increase was due m<ostIV to hiiglher-prices for rubber, coffee, palini oil, antd other vegetable oils.
Which countr-ies were the big wininers? In dollars, Malaysia registered the biggest gain ($1 .76 billion). Paliii oil led the way (S1.36 billion), followed bV rubber ($340 miilliol). Ihe other leaders were maiily coffee exporters. Brazil benefited the most, despite its coffee prodtuction A buoyalIt expor-t commodity in one sector otten leads to declinies il noniboominig export sectors. Resources flow into the boomlling sector, while investmenits elsewhere declinie. 'hTis coilin modity booms teiid tio shift profitability am11on0g tradablcs as resources shift to the booming business.
['hey cani also shift profitabilitv fromil tradables to nonitradables since somrIe of the incremental foreigi exchliangte earnings froll the comImoditv boomi will be spent on nontraded goods. For this to happell, foreign exchange eariniilgs need to be sol(d ftor local cLIrrency. If' the exchanige rate is floating, the cuIrenIcy will appreciate; if it is fixed, thie monley supply Will rise anid local prices with it anid helice the cuirenicv appreciates.
Olvervaltmation of the currency can persist for som))e time atter the boom endts. Past comimilodity hooms have bceen followed by sharp and prolonigetd price declinies. Th'l overall result 'T'he profitability of the once-boominiig export comimoditv is severely reduced, while othel export subsectoi-s have heenl devastated by thve large real appreciation of the currency.
Coin mi ocditv hoonins can also affect the gover-nlillelnt's budget deficit.
Wheln export coi iiiiio(litv prices soar, goverinimen'clt revenlUeS usuallV iicr-ease sharpIv. lI'is occurs directly if the resori-rcs are owiled by the public sector, isl s com o ill petioluli and mininig and minierals, or indirectly, tFrougIl increased export and imiport taxes andt hligiler incomlie tax r1'evenueS. h'let boost in revellues can elIcourage governiments to commit to long-term and expensive programils and projects. When commioditv prices decline, so do governimienit revelnues, but not expeilditures. As a result, couLtries are ofteni wor-se off than before the boomi. Witness Colombia, Kenya, anld 'Iazani.ia after coffeCe pirices boomed in the late I 70s. In the post -oil boom01 Nigeria of the 1970s anid early I 980s. thie sho0-tl'all of rCevenLues Was so sever-e that exter-nal1l borr-owing had risenl di-amatically eveni b horc oil lr-ices lbegall to fill. It was 1muLIcIh tIle salmle storv in Mtexico's and VCeIlaZLCIa's hadliaiigllg o)f thleir oil boomlis. Also, sinlce govel-lilnelits Leild to inlcrease their eXpenIdituLl-s with tIle win(dfall tax reveiluL, fiscal policy tenids to be pro(Aclical anid helice causes instability in the economy. I Ihis, according to ( uddington, hlas a detrimental impact on long-term econloiilic growth ((Luddingtoll 1988) .
For many1V (coimod(iitV-expor-tillg couLInties, boirowing in global markets is not an option. Ior them, internationial loans teind to be available whtenl t(hey are inot nteeded (whein coini modity priices are high) and un.available wlhenl they are needed( (w'heln pr-ices aire low).
['rade poli(ies can also partiv deteriniie the effects otf a commodity boom. If they p revciet revenues fromil being spent On imports, trade restrictionis miay lead to further-appreciation of the exchanlge rate. Such restrictions inay also skew incomlie distr-ibtionll. In Kenyla after tile 197(6_') cotffee bom, import and capitil controls increased reiits to suppliers oft capital goods an(d imported colIsumler goods so that much of the gain from the boom went to urban dwellers, who are the suppliers of the goods, aild inot to farmers.
In several commodity-depenldent countries, paarticularly in Africa, sigiliticant antiexport bias already exists because of milacroecoilomic iinstability, import protectioll, aild aid inflows. Ilherefore, avoidinlg the Dutch disease is especially important for these couLltries.
Learning from experience
Governimlenits have takenl various measures to stabilize revenues, neutralize the impact of foreigin exchianige initlows, and avoid the onset of
'Ilhev have adopted pruideiui fiscal policies, liberalized import restrictions and removed capital cont iols, tightened molnetary policies, accum-ulated foreigin reserves, anldt redLuced foreigin debt. But what were the specific measures, andl how effective were they? FXpX)11 ,lXs. In the latest coffee boom11, Cameroon, Cote dclvoire, Honduras, Uganda, Viet Nam, and oithers reintroduced export taxes. SucIh taxes, so the argumenlt goes, can alleviate both the spending and the resouLrce mnoveIeneit effects of the boom11 and protect nonboomilig tradable sectors. lax revenLIes shOuL1( be invested in high-yieldilig public investmiienit programs that increase long-termil growth.
In practice, however, tax rates are usually set too higih, and public investilmenit projects are often selected oni nonieconomic grounids. rhis tends to damiage the boomiiilng sector with little compensation elsewhere in the econoiyv. Andi there is the general risk of larger future deficits if the goverimeint makes long-terimi co ini-nitnienits based on boom -tinme tax reveniues.
Excessivel, high export taxes can cause other pr-oblemils, suchi as tax evasion anlid smugglilng, that call lower tax revelnues and cause serious disruptionis in the domestic market for the booming comimlodity. Llganda imposed an export tax of 32 percent on coffee in November 1994. Some exporters did not pay the tax and, as a result, were able to pay growers highier prices. Exporters who paid the tax (but still had to match the tax-dodgers' farm-gate price) are now, apparently, in financial trouble, Iow to moderate export taxes (acting as a windfall profit tax), however, could have beneficial effects by reducilng overinvestineit in the booming sector and providing incenitives for diversificationi. Civen the actual and potential problems, policvmakers should be careful when using export taxes to manlage cominoditv boomns and busts, particularly wheni setting the level of the taxes. Governtilenits can also use risk management tools to protect prices andt stabilize the revenues of small holders, who operate at volumes that are too small to make it attractive to directly applv risk maniagement i nstrumients. For examiiple, consider a country suLIcI as Mexico, which offeis a guaranteed mlinimlium price to cotton grower-s prior to planting. [iv offering the guarantee, the goverinmenit has assumlied on behallf of the farmer the risk that cotton prices will fall below that minilum.lil In many countries with minlilmlumLI price guarantes, the treasury ultimilately bears the cost of such programs. In Mexico, however, a governimlent agency puirchiases options in the international market, transfeirinig the risk off the governmenit books. 'I''he cost ot the option is known whilen the guaranitee is issued and remains tixed evenI thougIh the eventual cotton price is unlicertain. In Mexico the c-ost of the program is charged back to the participating cotton farmers, with little cost to the govelrment. ' 'I raders and prodLiceFs, too, canI benIefit from hedgiig. 'I'hev stand to inCuL big losses if the price of a comimioidity rises sharply and Illexplectedlv after they have comimlitted to deliver the conmmodity\ whichi they do nlot yet owIn, at somie fixed (and lower) price. Ixportel-s would lose bec(atise they wouldl have to pay miLCh highier prices to farm-ilers than the conililittedl price. Similarly, trader-s inlight contract to bluy the coinmoditv Ifromi farl-mers at a fixed price in the fL,tUre but would suffer if the pritc fell. They would receive a lowel price Whlell selling the Comm1lloditLy, and that price mligILt not cover the higher price they paid to farmers. Indonesian coffee exporters are said to have gonie bankrupt or Suffered mammoth losses in the miid-1 980)s (and in this past yvear) becaLIse thev did not take appropriate hedging actions. I Igandan coffee traders face simiilar-pr )blemns.
Market-based risk management instIumeniits iare good for dealinig withi relatively short-lived price disruptiolIs, bcLuse of-their maturities and market liqluidity. Agriicultural commodities are a case in poilt. Maturities and liquidity for metals and energy are longer, making longer-term hedging feasible.
I ledginlg involves certain costs. 'I'he USe' of LItLures involves miargini paymenilts that at tinies could create cashi-flow proiblems. Options involve the paVInCI)t of a preinium (if bougit), which is the cost of insuranlce against price declinIes (put Options) or increases (call options) Many couLItries ltce creditwolrthiness problenms in ac-cessing swaps and comnmodity-linked bonids. At timaes there is negative plurblicity associated with the use of hedlging instriumeIts for example, locking in a price for exports and theln witinessinig a price rise. Also, hedginlg oftcn requires establishiing a heciginig programil, such as installing appropriate accouHnting and moniitorilg systems and traininig people to trade. T'hse costs should be compared with the-bLelnfits [tom1 reduiccd uncertainitv.
I low muLIChl ShOUld a couLitr or a private firimi hedge? '[his depenids on a numibher of factors. Amionig the miost important are the identification of the risks of not hetdginig, the risk aversion of the tirm (or goverinment), the volatility in the market and so on l inally, hedCtgilng that uscs mar-ket-based linancial instrumIenIts adldress- ficulties, however-. Price slHiII)s teind to last ninch loiIger-that] booIms, so to achieve stabilization, large reserves i]e ed to be deposited into the f[1ind, and that colIId imiply financial (clsts in teritis of forgone opportoi]itics lor othel-piolnitable i nvestrmletmts. A large [m in( is also often not feasible fIor domiestic-pl itical reasonis, beCatIse of spendinig pressurcs from domiestic coInstitueLicies. Anld even with lar-ge deposits, thtre is still the possibilitv that a f'undi may go bust. 'I'le viability of such fLunlds depenids largelY on1 h1ow long the cornmmodity price chanige lasts and on the stabilizatioll rIle aidopLted. If exogenous shocks hiave a persistent effect Onl prices (or Prices revert to thieir nmeanl slowly), the financial sounldiness of the stabilization f-unld will ultimately come illtO queCStiOn. Stabilization funLdIs coLlIt also be subject to In isinililaaelilenlt of thleil-resourcessomewhat sinmila r to problems encotlinteletl with export taxes. I lowever, this is nlot as gorat a (danger as in the case of tax r-'VenlUS, SilnCe Stabilizationi thtd I-nd rveuIes al-e 1not included ill genlUR-. govern ment revenutes 'I'he fulid also ptrovides clear-rules oll whenll these revnILues should be spent, which is not the case with export taxes. Stabilization reserves in the fLind were used to buy back some of Chile's external debt.
Interinational Coffee Agreemelil, which uised anl export quiota system, and the International Cocoa Agreement and the International NatUral Rubber-Agreemient, whicil used buffer stocks. Only the rubber agreemenlt is still in force-just barely. Its effectiveness is being questioned hy sonie signatolies.
In January I'M95 soIe coffee-exporting coulItries introducedI a stock retelitioln schemelil to peg highi world colffee prices. In the 1986 boom, the government responded with less expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Most of the increased revenues were held by the National Coffee Fund. Some were invested in dollar-denominated instrunients, sonie used to purchase bonds forni the central bank, and sonie to repay external debt. The net effect was to sterilize about 60 percent of the windfall revenues though external debt repayments and about 20 percent through open-market operations. Only 20 percent of the increased revenues entered the money supply. On the fiscal side, coffee tax reveiiues were used to turn a deficit of 5.2 percent of CDP in 1984 into a small surplus in 1986. reveLues, divertillg it to less-productive activities that beniefit their coInstitLIelcies. AlIthouigh it is in the interest of all claimants niot to stflander the revell) e pool, i ndividnlal ckain man ts h1ave n1o inIcetive to act prudntIlIv if-ther-e are nIo gual-rantes that other clainiaiits will do likewise.
IhlliS lil ' ofr-CSeallrC suggests that prHde(nt ma n11agemenIt of coilillodiitV price hot0nIus could include chaliginlg budgetaly priocedul-es to make it less likelN that fiscal wincifalIs will be squaIldered. Greater centializationl of control over budget procedures migilt be one wav to hol down the nuhmber of claimailnts to windl 1I1 reveLues. If the p roposed solutioll is a revenlue stabilizatioll fuld, the anIalVsis highIligilts the importance of StrictIa isolatilng the suLI Luses accm0111-ate I inl the fun11d from-1 the genlerpl1ool Of reveuLIes. Resear-ch also shows that coomimiodity-depenidenti Co u1tries often stUffer fr1om Se\ver'e teHIrS of trade shlocks, and this, in tLirt), has had detrimental eflfects on1 their long-termi ecoInotIiic growth alnld inivestililet.
Who manages the boom?
At first glanlc, it seems tihat any booim migilt be milore easily ilmanlagedand tile impact of Dlutch disease softenied-ifi comimloditv prices were conitrolled by gover-nimienit (througIl a miarketinig board, for instance). 
How to manage booms
Sinice the receint price increases are expected to be short-lived, developing countries should manage the bulimper revenues carefully. Fxperience has showin that couLItries tihat adopted prudenit fiscal and monetary policies, accumulaited reserves, reduced foreigin debt, anid liberalized capital controls and import restrictionis saw long-terimi beneficial results from commodity boomns. Other, complementary policies have also been suggested. These policies cotld provide additionial benlefits, depenlding on the conditionis of the economies concerned and7 the nature of the boom. Policies employed to maniage commodity wind(f'all revelLues are: DLon't ov'erspend or overcomnunit. Governi menits should not commit to long-term spenidinlg that will be unsustainable when the boom fizzles. 'I'he experience of the 1970s shows that countries that adopted aggressive spendinig programs expecting the high prices to be permanenit faced hiuge debt-servicing problems when prices (and revenues) fell. To prevent this, a large slice of the incremiienltal reveilues should be used to build up intterinationial reserves, to be used whenl the boom ends.
Adiopt prudent nmonet(airy anld lisc-ail policies. (oninmodity-dependent coun-
tries are more vulnerable to external shiocks, making soulid macroeconomic policies especially critical. In this context, monetary and fiscal policies shotild not be expansionary, and countries could even consider reducilng exterinal debt with the proceeds l-romil thle boom. Recent research shows that comimiodity-depenident countries often suffer from low economic growth because of wide fluctuationis in thieir terms of trade.
Monetary policy should balance concerins over inflationi with coIncerns over currenicy appreciation. Capital-account controls (restrictions on investinig abroad) and import controls should be reduced to provide a way for foreign exchanige to flow out without affecting the monetary base. Investinig part of the boom proceeds in foreign assets will sterilize foreigil exchanige inflows and avoid expansion of the monietary base. Simiiarly, comimioditv hoom bonds can be viewed as savings in l1-0reigil currency and as aniothier effective way to sterilize foreign exchange inflows. leaier tineIs. I 'ie fli-dLIs shortld be treated as inIter-latiollal for-eigil reser-ves. I loweve, fritids otten unll iiito financial diflictilties because ofthe in1pl-edictability of co0ni1modity pirice b'oelhavior-Itlhy ar also subject to in isma nageinen t 11c,gc. X Market-hased hedginig i nstruLilmeritS (futuUres, octions, swaps) call incr-ease the predictibility of anticipated coinmodity-l-elated revenues anid make planinlilng easier for foli(yinakers. 'I'hey canl also assist private sector exporters and traders in handling their commilodity pirice risks. Wheln coinplenientirig a stabili/ation fit fd, thesei nIstrulmlelits canii iron ouit flows into and out of the fuLnId. lecaLuse hedginlg is a fol-rll of price insurance, it coiiies at a cost. I lenieiits of thlis cost inciude the options preniiutii the op ontuniity cost of ial-gill accouLIts, anid the admiiiiiistrative costs for settiliig rIp aiid rIinii'ig a hedginig program. I''iese costs should he compared with the hbenefits of hedging-a reductioni in uncertainty and a smiootiling ol sh ort-teriil price IirctLiatiols. 
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